



# RISC-V Privileged Architecture

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# New Draft Specifications are Released


- User ISA v2.2
  - Improvements to documentation
  - Defines how narrow-precision FP types are represented in wider FP registers
  - Defines behavior using wider FP operations on narrow operands
- Privileged ISA v1.10
  - Subject of this talk
- Specs available on Github (source & PDF)
- <https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual>
- Moved to editorship model



# Privileged Architecture is Stable

- 1.10 keeps compatibility with 1.9.1 for machine-mode-only implementations
- Future releases should be compatible with 1.10 for supervisor ISA, too
- Caveat: these are proposals; not yet ratified by Foundation

# RISC-V Privileged Architecture



- Provide clean split between layers of the software stack
- Application communicates with Application Execution Environment (AEE) via Application Binary Interface (ABI)
- OS communicates via Supervisor Execution Environment (SEE) via System Binary Interface (SBI)
- Hypervisor communicates via Hypervisor Binary Interface to Hypervisor Execution Environment
- All levels of ISA designed to support virtualization



# RISC-V Privilege Modes

- Three privilege modes
  - User (U-mode)
  - Supervisor (S-mode)
  - Machine (M-mode)
- Supported combinations of modes:
  - M (simple embedded systems)
  - M, U (embedded systems with protection)
  - M, S, U (systems running Unix-like operating systems)
- Planned support for hypervisors

# Simple Embedded Systems

- Simplest implementation needs only M-mode
- No address translation
- Minimal memory protection
  - Trap bad physical addresses precisely
- Application code is trusted
  
- Low implementation cost
  - $2^7$  bits of architectural state (in addition to user ISA)
  - $+2^7$  more bits for timers
  - $+2^7$  more for basic performance counters

# Embedded Systems with Protection

- Application code is not trusted
- Add U-mode; run app code in U-mode and trusted code in M-mode
- Possibly add  $N$  extension for user-level interrupts
- Still no address translation
- Need mechanism to protect physical memory

# Physical Memory Protection Unit

- Optional new feature in v1.10
- When PMP is implemented, modes below M-mode have no memory permissions by default
- Can grant R/W/X permissions on  $\geq 4$ -byte granularity
- Up to 16 PMP regions
- Each PMP region is any naturally aligned power-of-2 number of bytes
- Can configure adjacent PMP registers to form an arbitrary base-and-bounds region instead
- PMPs can be *locked* (can't be rewritten until reset), in which case they affect M-mode, too



# Support for Unix-like Operating Systems

- Add S-mode to provide virtual memory
- Memory divided into 4 KiB base pages
- Radix-tree page tables
  - 2 levels for RV32 (Sv32)
  - 3 or 4 levels for RV64 (Sv39, Sv48)
  - Encoding space reserved for Sv57/Sv64
- Superpages possible at all levels of page table
  - e.g. 2 MiB and 1 GiB for Sv39
- Hardware PT walks specified in supervisor ISA
  - Can trap to M-mode for software TLB refill



# Interaction between PMP and VM

- Physical Memory Protection and page-based virtual memory are composable
- Address translation happens first, possibly generating page-fault exceptions
- PMP unit checks translated address, possibly generating access exceptions
- Useful when S-mode code is untrusted

# RISC-V Page Table Entries

31	20 19	10 9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
PPN[1]	PPN[0]	RSW	D	A	G	U	X	W	R	V	

12                    10                    2                    1                    1                    1                    1                    1                    1                    1                    1                    1

- Separately controlled R, W, X permissions
  - Supports X-only pages
  - W & ~R combination reserved
- Supervisor can't access user pages by default
- Global bit indicates the mapping belongs to all address spaces (e.g. kernel pages in a Unix system)
- Accessed/Dirty bits optionally managed by HW
  - Updates must be atomic w.r.t. permissions check
  - Complex to implement, so permit trapping when A/D not set instead



# RISC-V Virtual Memory Control

- By default, S-mode can't access user pages
  - Helps detect OS/driver bugs
  - Still need ability to read user memory, e.g. on system call
  - Set “Supervisor Access to User Memory” bit in sstatus to read user memory, then turn it off again
- Similarly, S-mode can't read execute-only pages
  - Set “Make Executable Readable” bit in sstatus to override
  - Useful for illegal-instruction trap handlers
- S-mode can enable/disable VM and choose page-table depth in satp register



# RISC-V Interrupt Design Goals

- Simplicity
- Support all kinds of platforms from microcontrollers to virtualized servers
- Enable tradeoffs between performance and implementation cost
- Flexibility to support specialized needs



# Interrupt Uses in Different Applications

- High-performance Unix-like systems
  - Interrupt handling small fraction of processing time
    - Fast cores, smart devices
    - Minimal interrupt handler
    - Scheduling in software
- Low/mid embedded systems
  - Interrupt handling significant fraction of processor time
    - Slow cores, dumb devices
    - Significant fraction of code in handlers
    - Interrupt controller acts as task scheduler
- High-performance real-time systems
  - Can't waste time on interrupt overhead
  - Handlers poll I/O devices with regular heartbeat
- And everything inbetween




# Categorizing Sources of RISC-V Interrupts

- Local Interrupts
  - Directly connected to one hart
  - No arbitration between harts to service
  - Determine source directly through `xcause` CSR
  - Only two standard local interrupts (software, timer)
- Global (External) Interrupts
  - Routed via Platform-Level Interrupt Controller (PLIC)
  - PLIC arbitrates between multiple harts claiming interrupt
  - Read of memory-mapped register returns source

# Machine Interrupt Pending CSR (mip)

*(Add Non-Standard  
Local Interrupts Here)*



- **mip** reflects pending status of interrupts for hart
- Separate interrupts for each supported privilege level (M/S/U)
- User-level interrupt handling (“N”) optional feature when U-mode present (discussed later)

# Software Interrupts

- MSIP
  - Only writeable in machine-mode via memory-mapped control register (mapping is platform-specific)
  - One hart can write to different hart's MSIP register
  - Mechanism for inter-hart interrupts
- SSIP and USIP
  - Hart can only write bit  $x$ SIP in own **mip** register when running at privilege mode  $x$  or greater
- App/OS can only perform inter-hart interrupts via ABI/SBI calls
  - Destination virtual hart might be descheduled
  - Interrupts virtualized by M-mode software using MSIP



# Timer Interrupts


- MTIP
  - Single 64-bit real-time hardware timer and comparator in M-mode
  - MTIP set when `mtime`  $\geq$  `mtimecmp`
  - MTIP cleared by writing new `mtimecmp` value
- STIP and UTIP
  - M-mode multiplexes single hardware timer and comparator for lower-privilege modes on same hart
  - ABI/SBI calls to set up timer
  - M-mode software writes/clears STIP/UTIP
- Most systems will also have other hardware timers attached via PLIC etc.



# External Interrupts

- MEIP, SEIP, UEIP
  - Inputs from a Platform-Level Interrupt Controller (PLIC)
  - Each privilege mode has its own input from PLIC
  - Interrupts cleared with loads/stores to PLIC
  - Software can inject SEIP and UEIP interrupts to support virtualizing the PLIC


# Platform-Level Interrupt Controller (PLIC)






# Platform-Level Interrupt Controller

R



# Machine Interrupt Enable CSR (**mie**)



- **mie** mirrors layout of **mip**
- provides per-interrupt enables
- Also, global interrupt enables in **mstatus** for each privilege mode
- Interrupts always disabled for lower privilege modes; always enabled for higher privilege modes

# All interrupts trap to M-mode by default

- **mcause** register indicates which interrupt occurred
- M-mode can redirect to appropriate privilege level using MRET instruction

Interrupt	Exception Code	Description
1	0	User software interrupt
	1	Supervisor software interrupt
	2	<i>Reserved</i>
	3	Machine software interrupt
1	4	User timer interrupt
	5	Supervisor timer interrupt
	6	<i>Reserved</i>
	7	Machine timer interrupt
1	8	User external interrupt
	9	Supervisor external interrupt
	10	<i>Reserved</i>
	11	Machine external interrupt
1	$\geq 12$	<i>Reserved</i>



# Optional Interrupt Handler Delegation

- Can delegate interrupt (and exception) handling to lower privilege level to reduce overhead
- **mideleg** has same layout as **mip**
- If a bit is set in **mideleg** then corresponding interrupt delegated to next lowest privilege level (S or U)
- Can be delegated again using **sideleg**
- Once delegated, the interrupt will not affect current privilege level (**mie** setting ignored)



# Hypervisor Status

- Previous spec sketched a fourth privilege mode, H, above S (M/H/S/U)
- Designed for Type-1 hypervisor support
- Feedback from community led us to pursue HW support for Type-2 hypervisors (like KVM) instead
  - Still works well for Type-1 hypervisors
- Plan is to make a full proposal by September



# Implementation Status

- Spike and UCB Rocket-Chip conform to v1.10
- Linux port to v1.10 works with Spike/Rocket
  - Working on upstreaming the Linux kernel
- Upstream GCC and binutils ports are compatible



# Questions?

Specs available at  
<https://github.com/riscv/riscv-isa-manual>