

# RISC-V Summit

December 3 - 6, 2018  
Santa Clara Convention Center  
CA, USA

## Revolutionizing the Computing Landscape and Beyond



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# RISC-V Summit

## RISC-V MultiCore Secure Boot

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
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
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# PolarFire SoC FPGA




- PolarFire SoC FPGA is built around a multi-core RV64 capable of running full Linux and real-time OS, extensible through the FPGA fabric.
  - Based on SiFive U54-MC CoreComplex featuring E51/U54 processors
- Hybrid compute platform combines multi-core CPU, peripherals and custom HW accelerators in the FPGA fabric, which provides compelling value when balancing flexibility, functionality, throughput, power consumption and form factor.
- Security has emerged as the preeminent concern as SoC FPGAs are proliferated into a vast number of embedded systems applications where higher levels of reliability and tamper-resistance are fundamental requirements.
- Security concern is compounded when one considers “field programmability,” which is inherent to the very basic value proposition of such devices.

# Secure Boot



- Guards against sophisticated methods of attack whereby a malicious external agent tampers with the boot image stored in bootflash (e.g Linux FSBL)
- Authenticates the image in bootflash before transferring execution control to the OS boot loader pointed to by reset vector
- FPGA system controller (root of trust) manages the authentication process and certifies boot image using crypto functionality built into the FPGA backbone
  - Push “zero state boot loader” (ZSBL) upon detecting HW reset.
  - Release monitor core from reset and executes authentication on FSBL image pointed to by reset vector.
  - If authentication is successful, transfer execution control back to FSBL, otherwise abort.

# Authentication Framework



- ZSBL bootloader authenticates FSBL image in bootflash which contains:
  - Actual FSBL image
  - SBIC data structure generated during bootflash programming and stored @ SBIC\_ADDR
- Authenticity of SBIC is verified by FPGA system controller using ECDSA:
  - UCSQ is a public key programmed on the device by the user
  - Corresponds to UCSK private key used to sign the SBIC during programming

Value	Description
<b>IMAGE_ADDR</b>	Address of FSBL in SOC Memory map
<b>IMAGE_LEN</b>	Size of FSBL in Bytes
<b>BOOT_VEC<sub>0</sub></b>	Boot Vector in FSBL Monitor Core
<b>BOOT_VEC<sub>1-4</sub></b>	Boot Vectors for User Cores
<b>H</b>	FSBL Image Hash (SHA512-256)
<b>CODESIG</b>	SBIC Digital Signature (ECDSA)


Secure Boot Image Certificate (SBIC)

$$\text{CODESIG} = \text{ECDSA}_{\text{SIGN}} (\text{UCSK}, \text{IMAGE\_ADDR} \mid \text{IMAGE\_LEN} \mid \text{BOOTVEC}_{0-4} \mid \text{H})$$

$$\text{ECDSA}_{\text{VERIFY}} (\text{UCSQ}, \text{IMAGE\_ADDR} \mid \text{IMAGE\_LEN} \mid \text{BOOTVEC}_{0-4} \mid \text{H}, \text{CODESIG})$$


Elliptic Curve Digital Signature  
Algorithm (ECDSA)

# Authentication Flow




- System controller pulls SBIC and authenticates using ECDSA on crypto processor
- System controller pushes ZSBL from ROM/sNVM to monitor core DTIM
- ZSBL computes FSBL Hash H' and compares it to SBIC.H
- Transfer execution control to FSBL
- Invalid SBIC signature or invalid hash:
  - Abort boot and halt multi-core
  - Tamper flag raised to FPGA

# Boot Image Secure Hash (SHA-512/256)



- SHA-512/256 is cryptographically similar to SHA-256 but uses 64-bit arithmetic
  - Has more rounds than SHA256 but processes twice as much data
- Algorithm consists of 2 main operations:
  - Message scheduling
  - Hash computation
- Message scheduling runs on U54<sub>0</sub>
  - Blocks of 1024 bits are processed and pushed onto message queue
- Hash computation runs on E51
  - E51 reads each block from message queue and adds to hash accumulator
- Message scheduling has complexity similar to Hash computation
  - Achieves close to 2x speed up over single-threaded approach

# Conclusion



- Secure Hash implementation described here is optimized for the proper balance of compute v/s IO
  - Bootflash read cycle time  $\approx 40\text{ns}$
- Experimented with multiple variations of code/data locations in DTIM v/s L2 LIM
  - Code/data in DTIM yielded the highest throughput
- Throughput achieved is deemed more than adequate for target applications
  - 8.4ms per 128KB @600MHz
- Flexible and cost-effective
  - All RV64 code including atomic operations for queue pointer synchronization
  - No special accelerators required



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# Thank you



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